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Introduction 
 
“It is an essential idea of democracy that these leaders shall be of the people; they 
must not be gentlemen of wealth and leisure, but they must ‒ the mass of them at any rate ‒ 
belong to the class that makes its own living. If, then, they are to devote their time to politics, 
politics must be made to pay” 1. 
 
This thesis will focus on the use of patronage and the role of the spoils system in the New York 
at the end of the 19th century. The features of a spoils system, in which government jobs are 
based on political affiliation, are particularly interesting when placed in the discussion of 
democratic legitimacy. The spoils system in the United States is strongly affiliated with urban 
political machines. The interpretations of these machines shifted over the years. Many 
historians of these political organizations denounce them as corrupt and undemocratic. But 
Theodore J. Lowi suggested in 1976 that the old machine system might actually run the cities 
more efficiently than the civil service-inspired procedures common in his days.2 He has a point 
that, when it comes to efficiency, the political machine ran the city well. The political leaders 
were closely connected to the citizens. Given the size of the population, it can be argued that 
the connection between political power brokers and the city neighborhoods was closer at the 
end of the 19th century than it was in the 1970s. However, with a much larger and changed 
society it is difficult to say whether the practices of the machine would have been possible in 
the 1970s. The machines were able to maintain their power by satisfying the needs of their 
voters, a large number of citizens. In a democracy, the larger number decides the election 
outcome. 
In the years after the American Civil War a debate between the political machine and 
civil service reformers began about the way the machine gathered its votes. With the spoils 
system and the use of patronage the machines used political means that, in the eyes of their 
opponents, raised questions about their legitimacy. This thesis will outline the contrast between 
the ideas of the defenders of the spoils system and the ideas of the civil service reformers in 
New York at the end of the nineteenth century to answer the question who has the best claim 
on democratic legitimacy in this New York debate between defenders of the spoils system and 
civil service reformers. 
                                                          
1 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the patronage (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905), 156. 
2 Theodore J. Lowi, “Machine politics- Old and New,” The Public Interest, 9 (1967), 91-92. 
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The ideas and arguments will be drawn from various primary sources. They include 
autobiographical works such as The autobiography of Lincoln Steffens by Lincoln Steffens 
(1931) and talks by George W. Plunkitt in Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, written down by William 
L. Riordon (1905). Government documents such as The National Civil Service Reform 
League’s evaluations will be used as well. Other primary sources include newspaper articles 
from for example the New York Times and Harper’s Weekly.  
In the quote at the beginning of this introduction Carl Russel Fish addresses a democratic 
principle that, he claims, is the true cause for the beginning of the spoils system. The leaders he 
refers to are the leaders of political parties. These political parties are necessary to organize the 
people. As the quote states, the men who devote their lives to politics must not only be allowed 
to do their work but also be rewarded. This is where the spoils system becomes evident: “the 
civil service becomes the pay-roll of the party leader; offices are apportioned according to the 
rank and merits of his subordinates, and, if duties are too heavy or new positions are needed, 
new offices may be created” 3 In this sense, the spoils system fulfills a need generated by the 
fundamentals of democracy. 
Two tendencies constitute the spoils system: “first, the custom of using the public 
offices openly and continuously as ammunition in party warfare; second, the evolution of the 
idea of rotation in office”4. The principle of rotation functioned as a motive to make removals.5 
The civil service functioned as the prize of the elections. Every fourth of March, men would be 
betting “heavy expense and vast loss of time on the chance of getting something out of the 
hurly-burly.”6 Even the most revered president, Abraham Lincoln, skillfully used the powerful 
tool of patronage. He refused, however, to re-allot the offices after March 5, 1865, and the 
popularity of rotation gradually declined from that moment on.7 Still, after the Civil War the 
spoils system remained deeply rooted in the political institutions because of new economic, 
social and political forces. A materialistic decade followed that drove ambitious men to private 
enterprises instead of public affairs, which were now in the hands of professional politicians.8 
The pre-war leaders were replaced by a new type of congressmen and local politicians who yet 
held on to a pre-war political philosophy, according to which “party loyalty was rewarded by 
                                                          
3 Fish, The Civil Service and the patronage, 157. 
4 Ibid., 79. 
5 Ibid., 159. 
6 Ibid., 158. 
7 Adelbert Bower Sageser, The First Two Decades of the Pendleton Act: A study of Civil Service Reform (Literary 
Licensing, LLC, 2013), 9-10. 
8 Sageser, The First Two Decades Of The Pendleton Act, 9-10. 
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appointment to positions or sinecures”9. They continued to use the philosophy of the spoils 
system. 
Senator Charles Sumner introduced a bill in 1864 to create greater efficiency in the civil 
service that aimed to destroy the patronage system. With this bill, he opened a twenty-year 
campaign for competitive examination of government bureaucrats. The most practicable bill, 
however, was introduced by George H. Pendleton. The Pendleton Bill called for a commission 
of five members to assist the President “in making rules, supervise examinations, conduct 
investigations, and submit an annual report to the President” in relation to civil service10. The 
proposed bill asked for open competitive examinations where practical, merit and competition 
as basis for promotion, and the prohibition of compulsory political contributions. When 
Pendleton reintroduced his Bill at the end of 1881 he displayed the extremes to which the spoils 
system could lead by using the example of the assassination of President Garfield: Garfield was 
assassinated by a disappointed office-seeker.11 
Between 1881 and 1883 the debate on the government civil service grew tremendously. 
Both the reformers and the opponents of reform came up with numerous arguments defending 
their convictions. One of the issues they addressed was the influence of the political parties. 
The reformers argued that the spoils system lowered the character of state and national 
legislatures since “the parties had been subsidized and debased so that there were frequent 
inducements for political crimes.”12 The reformers saw that the political machine emerged out 
of the spoils system, which extended the activities of the parties beyond their legitimate sphere. 
The reformers’ aim was to insist that the parties function without the use of patronage; they 
therefore introduced a Bill to establish a check on party influence. The opponents of reform, 
however, argued that there would be no parties without the spoils system. Those who wanted 
to serve their country in a government job lost their “patriotism” when they had to take a 
competency test.13 Parties would lose valuable workers: “with the destruction of the spoils 
system political devotion, gallantry, and love of country would become obsolete.”14 Eventually, 
President Arthur approved the Bill and to the satisfaction of the reformers it became law on 
January 16, 1883. The Pendleton Act aimed to end the spoils system by introducing government 
jobs based on merit instead of political affiliation.  
                                                          
9 Ibid., 11. 
10 Ibid., 41. 
11 Ibid., 36-43. 
12 Ibid., 45. 
13 William L. Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (1905), Chapter 17. 
14 Sageser, The First Two Decades of The Pendleton Act, 47. 
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As I mentioned before, the spoils system in the United States is strongly affiliated with 
the concept of machine politics: “an institution peculiar to American cities.”15 As the reformers 
argued, the political machine came into being after the spoils system gained a foothold.16 The 
American machine was “centralized, integrated, and relatively ruthless” 17 . The leader in 
machine politics was “the Boss.” Even though the roots of this system lay far back in the history 
of the United States, it transformed from a “collection of small, disparate groups into a 
hierarchically structured, formally organized political entity” during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This is related to the physical growth of the American cities and the 
immigration from Europe during this period, which transformed these cities into the 
metropolises they are today.18  
From roughly the 1840s on American society experienced a massive transformation. 
This transformation changed society from an agrarian one into a modern, industrial and urban 
one, with an integral part for the city.19 The expansion of the cities caused a confusion in the 
power networks creating a need for stability and security. This paved the way for ambitious 
men to establish the urban political machine and gain the powers and the rewards of municipal 
government.20 The city boss emerged because of several critical factors: “rapid urbanization, 
immigration (foreign and domestic), obsolescence of formal governmental structure, demand 
for more municipal services, and the rise of the full-time professional politician.”21 One of the 
cities characterized by machine politics and the City Boss is New York City. Tammany Hall 
was the home of the Democratic party that produced several City Bosses. It was no secret that 
Tammany Hall used patronage and thus the principles of the spoils system. While the Pendleton 
Act ended the spoils system on a federal level in 1883, the change on the local level wasn’t as 
significant. For example the City Bosses of New York City continued their machine politics 
even into the twentieth century: only when, in 1933, Fiorello H. La Guardia was sworn in as 
Mayor of New York city, according to historians the end of the dominance of the Tammany 
Hall “Bosses” in New York city began to take shape.22 
                                                          
15 Lowi, “ Machine politics- Old and New,” 83. 
16 Sageser, The First Two Decades of The Pendleton Act, 45. 
17 Lowi, “ Machine politics- Old and New,” 83. 
18 David R. Colburn and George E. Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American 
History,” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (1976): 445-446. 
19 Alexander B. Jr. Callow, The City Boss in America: An interpretive reader (New York:  
 Oxford University Press, 1976), 4. 
20 Colburn and Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History,” 446. 
21 Callow, The City Boss in America: An interpretive reader, 4. 
22 Arthur Mann, La Guardia comes to power: 1933 (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1965). 
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In the debate about the arguments of both the defenders of the spoils system and the 
civil service reformers, questions concerning democracy and legitimacy are highly relevant. To 
analyze and evaluate the arguments the defenders of the spoils system and the civil service 
reformers put forth, this thesis uses the perspective on legitimacy described by Pierre 
Rosanvallon. In his books Counter-democracy (2008) and Democratic Legitimacy (2011) 
Rosanvallon offers an historical overview of democratic systems and he outlines the principles 
of a legitimate democracy.23 He uses the development and dysfunctions of democracy to come 
to a new form of democracy, namely the democracy of appropriation. This new form of 
democracy is necessary since the established forms of democratic regimes have become 
insufficient. The democratic regimes he describes “established themselves on a dual foundation: 
universal suffrage and public administration”24. The universal suffrage was realized through 
elections. However, electoral legitimacy has declined and elections have become insufficient 
as the only form of legitimacy. A chosen government is, through its bureaucracy, supposed to 
implement the choices of the voters and offer them services. The bureaucracy is meant to 
implement and have no further “culpable usurpation of power that rightly belonged to the 
people.” 25  Democracy has become more than mere elections and the generally positive 
reputation of civil servants has changed as well. The original forms of elections and the 
bureaucracy are therefore no longer enough to sustain legitimacy. According to Rosanvallon, 
there is a need to find new foundations for democratic legitimacy.26  
In Democratic Legitimacy Rosanvallon illustrates the democracy of appropriation as a 
new democratic regime which ought to “repair the major flaws in the majoritarian democracy 
of the ballot box.”27 In this democracy of appropriation three intertwining aspects are important: 
distrust which leads to counter-democratic action, independent democratic agencies, and the 
aspect that actions of the leaders don’t always correspond with how they are conducted and 
selected.28  
Rosanvallon states that democracies deal with a gap between legitimacy and trust. 
Therefore organized forms of distrust are included to make sure that “democracy restricts 
democracy.”29 Rosanvallon uses three main types of power through which democratic distrust 
                                                          
23  Pierre Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 
24 Rosanvallon,  Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, 3.  
25 Ibid., 33. 
26 Ibid., 33-71. 
27 Ibid., 221. 
28 Ibid., 219-221. 
29 Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter- Democracy: Politics in an age of distrust (Cambridge: University Press, 2008), 
253. 
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is expressed, namely: oversight, sanction and prevention, and judgment. These types function 
as counter-powers in an electoral- representative democracy and they require civic engagement 
and participation by citizens. The first type of power entails surveillance or oversight power. 
The three principal modalities of oversight are vigilance, denunciation, and evaluation. 30 
Vigilance entails a presence of citizens concerned with the public good and new forms of social 
attentiveness that cause change.31 Denunciation is related to transparency. This modality entails 
an exposure or revealing by journalists of scandals or other inappropriate actions, which creates 
a certain “journalistic credo.”32 Through evaluation, the third modality, the government is 
supposed to improve its quality and efficiency. It is also tightening the legitimacy restrictions 
on the government. Government officials have to explain their actions and show their 
competence during these evaluations.33  
Sanction and prevention are a second type of counter-democratic power that derive from 
the right to resist. Rosanvallon describes this power as organizations set up by the people to 
represent them, and engage in social protest or opposition. Most obvious, however, in 
preventive powers are elections. Nowadays the issue of populism comes up as a way of 
resistance towards the government. However, as will be further discussed in the history of the 
members of Tammany Hall, in the opening decade of the 20th century immigrant and 
immigrant-stock political figures created a new political culture which was, compared to the 
old New York situation, more populist and more representative of the city.34 At that time, their 
populism functioned as a substitute for the lack of services by the government. It can be 
interpreted as a way of resistance as well. 
Judgment forms the third type of power in counter-democracy, more specifically “the 
people as judge.”35 The role of judging plays an important role in the democracy: “ordinary 
democratic activity is a permanent mixture of political decisions and judicial decisions.”36 
Rosanvallon illustrates this through the example of political candidates who are convicted of 
corruption because of patronage, but who are still elected afterwards. This case shows the 
opposition between “political proximity” and “judicial distance”.37  
                                                          
30 Rosanvallon,  Counter- Democracy: Politics in an age of distrust, 29-32. 
31 Ibid., 34-40. 
32 Ibid., 41-52. 
33 Ibid., 53-56. 
34 Terry Golway, Machine Made: Tammany Hall and the creation of modern American politics (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2014), 46. 
35 Rosanvallon, Counter- Democracy: Politics in an age of distrust, 191. 
36 Ibid., 242. 
37 Ibid., 244. 
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These counter-democratic actions are translated into three forms of legitimacy set by 
Rosanvallon: impartiality, reflexivity and proximity. According to Rosanvallon, in the creation 
of a democratic society the politics of impartiality is a necessary tool.38 An impartial democracy 
consists of two poles, the ballot box and the independent authorities. On the one hand these 
poles clash, especially on the issue of legitimacy; on the other hand they complement each 
other.39 Main reasons for establishing independent authorities are filling a gap of technical 
knowledge and preventing a claim of partiality. Thus pragmatic reasons form the basis for 
establishing these kinds of authorities. Their theoretical and constitutional status, however, is 
unclear. Still, citizens have more faith in the abilities of NGOs to establish solutions to problems 
which can be beneficial to everyone, than political parties. Thus elected doesn’t necessarily 
equal legitimate.40  
When it comes to democracy, impartiality offers accessibility and thus a voice to those 
otherwise neglected or forgotten. This is consistent with the element of attentiveness that 
representation requires. As we will see, the Bosses of New York considered themselves as the 
ones fulfilling the impartial role. According to Richard Croker, Boss of Tammany Hall from 
1886 to 1901, the city required a boss “because there’s a mayor and a council and judges, and 
a hundred other men to deal with.”41  Order in such a city required, in Croker’s view, a 
theoretically impartial boss who was able to arbitrate the conflicting interests and ambitions of 
the city’s political and commercial classes. Even though they don’t fit the description of 
independent authorities and the associated features, at the end of the nineteenth century the 
Bosses created their own “theoretically impartial” status in New York. 
Another form of legitimacy is reflexivity. A reflexive democracy attempts to 
compensate three unrealistic assumptions of electoral-representative democracy. These 
assumptions are that the voters parallel the general will, that they equate the people, and that 
from the moment of voting the promises made by the officials are translated into political action. 
Next to the earlier mentioned independent authorities, Rosanvallon mentions the media as 
reflexive institutions as well, for instance journalists. Through newspapers, they offer the 
citizens an insight into the functioning of the government. They review its functioning; as a 
result they create different interpretations of the functioning of the government. The legitimacy 
of reflexive powers is different than the legitimacy of sovereignty: “The more divided the 
                                                          
38 Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, 119. 
39 Ibid., 88-92. 
40 Ibid., 79-86. 
41 Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931), 
236. 
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partisan political sphere appears, the greater the legitimacy of a reflexive institution intervening 
in controversial issues.”42 As will become clear, at the end of the nineteenth century, the media 
influenced the debate between defenders of the spoils system and civil service reformers. So-
called muckraking journalists of for example the New York Times opened successful “crusades” 
on corrupt politicians. Cartoons by Thomas Nast were popular as well, since a significant part 
of society wasn’t able to read. Newspapers therefore had quite an influence on citizens as 
reflexive institutions. 
The third form of legitimacy is proximity, which stands for the relationship that citizens 
aim to have with their leaders. This relationship includes political leaders who share their 
experience with citizens and who consult the citizens about what needs to be done.43 This is 
related to participation, which Rosanvallon also addresses as interactive democracy. This leads 
to a new form of democratic interaction in which proximity has become more than solely 
casting votes. Justification and exchange of information are included now and elections are only 
one element of the whole process. An important element of proximity is attention to 
particularity. It is important for individuals that authorities are attentive, respectful, and offer 
them a certain “status”.44  
For Tammany Hall, we will see, proximity was a very important element: it legitimized 
its presence and power. As George W. Plunkitt states, it is important for a statesman, if he wants 
to maintain his district, to study human nature. This entails an awareness of the needs of the 
people and acting in accordance with these needs. Plunkitt helps families in need, for example 
by offering a job to a “deservin’ man”: “It’s philanthropy, but it’s politics, too–mighty good 
politics.”45 Hence, recognition is important: “In an age defined by the quest for recognition, 
power is recognized as legitimate if it is attentive to individual situations and makes the 
language of recognition its own”46. This is intertwined with the concept of care which, in this 
context, entails attention for the individual. Thanks to this kind of particularity, citizens start to 
see democracy as a form of government including a sort of “living” generality which is attentive 
to individual variety.47  During elections, citizens choose their political leaders on the basis of 
competency, but also on the basis of their own ability to identify themselves with the candidate. 
                                                          
42 Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, 166-167. 
43 Ibid., 171. 
44 Ibid., 179. 
45 Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. 
46 Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy: Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, 179. 
47 Ibid., 179-186. 
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It is important for politicians to show empathy. Power is seen as legitimate if it can bring the 
narrative and physical aspects of representation to life.48 
The forms of legitimacy and counter-democratic powers offered by Rosanvallon create 
a framework to analyze the civil service reformers and the defenders of the spoil system in the 
United States, more specifically in New York at the end of the nineteenth century. The 
upcoming Chapter 1 entails the arguments by the defenders of the spoils system, which are 
drawn from the ideas of the “Bosses” and other members of the machine politics of Tammany 
Hall in New York, for example George W. Plunkitt, William “Boss” Tweed and Boss Charles 
Murphy. Chapter 2 will outline the arguments of the civil service reformers drawn from for 
instance James Bryce’s American Commonwealth Volume II and arguments by Carl Schurz. 
The arguments described in Chapter 1 and 2 will then be evaluated in Chapter 3 with the 
theoretical framework outlined in the introduction. The arguments in Chapter 1 and 2 will be 
outlined in a chronological structure. The evaluation in Chapter 3 will be structured in 
accordance with the theoretical framework. This will lead to a conclusion with an answer to the 
research question. 
The civil service reformers and the merit system are in general seen as more legitimate 
than the political machines and the spoils system. However, this thesis will argue a more 
pessimistic view on the civil service reformers. In order to establish change they cooperated 
with other reform groups with different ideological backgrounds. This “combined” reform 
group was criticized by for example Lincoln Steffens in the Shame of the Cities for its objective 
to install business methods and businessmen in government. Thomas Nast criticized the 
reformers as well on their elitist characteristics and a lack of humility. These subjects of critique 
are related to the question of legitimacy as will be further explained in Chapter 3. Historical 
studies of bosses and political machines generally focus on their corruption. In this sense, 
current-day historians resemble the reformers of the nineteenth century. This thesis includes a 
broader perspective on the functioning of the political machine which is in line with more recent 
historical work such as Machine Made: Tammany Hall and the creation of modern American 
politics by Terry Golway and “Machine politics- Old and New” by Theodor Lowi. They offer 
a more positive view on the legitimacy of political machines like Tammany Hall. Nonetheless 
the corruption in political machines was significant and Tammany was an imperfect institution. 
Corruption always undermines principles of a legitimate democracy: that remains an issue.  
                                                          
48 Ibid., 187-192. 
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At the end of the nineteenth century, defenders of the spoils system and the civil service 
reformers had different perceptions of democracy and legitimacy. By analyzing the debate 
between these two groups against the backdrop of recent theories on democratic legitimacy this 
thesis provides a new perspective on the functioning of the political machines on the one hand 
and the civil service reformers on the other. It offers new insight into the role of democratic 
legitimacy in changing societies. Rosanvallon’s framework sets new standards for a legitimate 
democracy; using these standards to evaluate a historical debate might offer new insights into 
the practical functioning of a legitimate democracy. As this thesis will illustrate, both the civil 
service reformers and the political machines have a justified claim on elements of democratic 
legitimacy. Both the political machine and the civil service reformers changed their attitudes 
and actions in accordance with societal changes. This was necessary in order to win elections. 
Tammany Hall was able for decades to win elections and was eventually “defeated” by a “new” 
political machine created by La Guardia. However, this “new” political machine departed from 
the old local patronage system. 
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Chapter 1: Bosses and patronage 
As stated in the Introduction, the Pendleton Act ended the spoils system on a federal level. The 
merit system became the new standard in government administration. However, as will be 
further discussed in Chapter 2, this didn’t happen overnight. The same goes for the reform 
changes on lower levels of the government. Patronage remained an important instrument in 
several lower governmental institutions, for example in the state of New York and the 
municipality of New York City. Nowadays there are still cases of corruption in for example the 
state government of New York. Recent research shows that when it comes to the number of 
public corruption cases, New York has the most compared to other states. 1  According to 
Jennifer Rodgers, executive director of the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity, the 
corruption in New York State is a cultural issue. The corruption is connected to the political 
system as it developed over more than 200 years:  "So you start with these corrupt political 
machines like Tammany Hall, and over time the problem replicates itself as the next generation 
figures out how things work and how much corruption will be tolerated, and so on down the 
line. We've made some progress, of course, but not enough"2. According to Jennifer Rodgers 
the corruption that haunts New York nowadays thus stems from the corruption institutionalized 
by political machines like Tammany Hall.  
Political machines, or the “Boss” system, go far back into the history of the United States, 
“but the full transformation of the machine from a collection of small, disparate groups into a 
hierarchically structured, formally organized political entity dates from the second half of the 
nineteen century” 3 . Political machines used political patronage, which included selecting 
personnel on grounds of contributions to the party and party loyalty instead of impersonal 
qualifications. Political machines can also be referred to as “Boss systems”. The Boss was the 
leader of the machine, which members voted for regardless of their individual judgments.4 
Because of the use of patronage and the central power of the Boss, political machines are 
generally viewed as “bad” and undesirable. However, the political machine had its functions 
which made it a democratic legitimate institution. This chapter illustrates the functions of the 
political machine with a chronological historical overview of a political machine in New York 
                                                          
1 Dan Clark, “Yes, New York has more corrupt officials than any other state,” Politifact New York, September 
19, 2016,  http://www.politifact.com/new-york/statements/2016/sep/19/elaine-phillips/new-york-has-
been-most-corrupt-state-decades/. 
2 Clark, “Yes, New York has more corrupt officials than any other state”. 
3 Colburn and Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History,” 445-446. 
4 Robert K. Merton, “The Latent functions of the machine, A sociologist’s view” in The City Boss in America: An 
interpretive reader, ed. Alexander B. Jr. Callow (New York: Oxford University Press, 197), 23. 
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(Tammany Hall) and its Bosses and constituents. This is followed by a more general discussion 
of machine politics in which the important elements and functions are emphasized. This chapter 
will therefore offer a more positive view on the functioning and actions of a political machine. 
The historical overview and general discussion will be used to evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of the political machine in contrast to the civil service reformers in Chapter 3. 
1.1. Tammany Hall 
Tammany hall is a political organization that represented the Democratic party in New York 
during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. It was one of the most powerful local 
political machines in the United States. In this thesis, Tammany Hall illustrates the practical 
functioning of a political machine. It was originally established as the meeting place for the 
Tammany Society. This society took its name from “Tamanend”, a chief of the Lenni-Lenape 
tribe who supposedly welcomed William Penn to the New World in 1682. They were dedicated 
to “the true and genuine principles of republicanism” and they saw the native Americans as the 
“true repositories of equality and egalitarianism”5. The society transformed into a political 
machine which required a separate organization, namely Tammany Hall. The real political 
power wasn’t in the hands of the leaders of Tammany society, but it rested in the hands of the 
“Boss”. He was selected by the party’s general committee and therefore he held the true political 
power of Tammany Hall.6 Tammany Hall placed itself in the political battles in old New York, 
“a city governed by Anglo-Protestant patricians and mercantile elites”7.  
Tammany Hall and its influence grew with the Great Famine immigration. This 
immigration, caused by the failing of the Ireland’s potato crop, marked the beginning of the end 
of the “old” New York. In ten years the population of New York City grew from 371.000 to 
630.000 because of the immigration: “in the mid-1850s, more than one in four New Yorkers 
was a native of Ireland, and 52 percent of the city’s residents were foreign- born”8. The growing 
influence of Tammany Hall follows from the impact that the Famine immigration had on New 
York’s civic and political life. In contrast to earlier Irish immigrants who brought an affection 
for Ireland with them, the Famine immigrants held no warm memories of Ireland. Their 
experiences led to anxieties about the very basics of life. Their goal was to have food on their 
table and a roof over the house they were living in. Another contrast to immigrants before 1840 
is that these immigrants remained in the city, and were desperately poor and ignorant of 
                                                          
5 Golway, Machine Made: Tammany Hall and the creation of modern American politics, 5-6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 40. 
8 Ibid., 41. 
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American social and political institutions. 9  To win their votes, the machine offered an 
Americanization process. This process offered patronage for a commitment to American social 
and political institutions. 10  The government offered protection through a secure public 
employment. The immigrants therefore developed a strong presence in New York government 
jobs. 
The role for Tammany was to offer these government jobs to Irish immigrants and so 
they did. Compared to other immigrant groups “the Irish were more active in city politics and 
so were in a better position to take advantage of Tammany patronage” 11 . Tammany Hall 
recognized a shift in power in the city which was inevitable because of the tens of thousands of 
Irish immigrants. Tammany recognized the power of the numbers and they abandoned their 
connection to nativism. Already by 1844, the Catholic Irish formed the largest immigrant group 
in New York. About 95 percent of this group voted for the Democratic party.12 In Ireland, the 
Protestants used patronage and discriminatory laws in order to maintain power at the expense 
of the Catholics. In the United States, the Catholic Irish turned to the Democrats for protection 
from the Republican Party which formed the same hostile power as the Protestants in Ireland. 
Another motive was their hostility towards the abolitionist and the anti-slavery movement of 
the Republican party, since free black labor meant competition for the Catholic Irish.13  
The most notorious Boss of Tammany hall was William Tweed. In 1869 he was named 
grand sachem of the Tammany Society which gave him the power to select candidates, 
Tammany candidates more specifically, for important governmental offices. People started to 
call him “Boss” when he assumed control of the Public Works Department, which meant that 
“hundreds of jobs and millions in contracts would be at Tweed’s disposal”14. Besides his almost 
complete power over New York politics, his ambition drove him into the private sector as well. 
He established “the Ring” with his allies, which formed his strategy to “pillage the city treasury, 
conquer the state and finally the nation”15. In his politics, however, he focused on earning and 
keeping the Irish vote. In order to do this, he showed signs of respect and affection by organizing 
picnics for children, giving a voice to Irish community’s aspirations for Ireland and by making 
sure that in state charitable appropriations the Catholic Church was taken care of.16  
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Resistance came inter-alia from Protestant Irish immigrants who saw the Irish-Catholic 
voters as ignorant. They were ruining the sector and, according to the editor of The Nation E.L. 
Godkin, “It was time […] for the city’s better elements to make their voices heard, for ‘the 
Anglo-Saxon race’ was not inclined to stand idly by while it was ‘robbed’”17. Eventually “Boss” 
Tweed was removed as grand sachem and banned from Tammany society, since he was arrested 
and prosecuted. Nonetheless, he remains the face of Tammany Hall, which he made famous. 
He remains the face of urban corruption as well. 
 “Honest” John Kelly was supposed to “save” Tammany after the disaster of Tweed.  
Kelly took action by establishing a closer grip on freelancers who were handing out patronage 
and favors on their own. The power and thus the control of Tammany’s patronage were to be 
centralized in Tammany Hall. John Kelly kept control of Tammany through its construction. 
The basic unit of political geography, the Assembly districts, had its own leaders, who were 
members of Tammany’s Executive Committee. They led several committees in smaller political 
units, called the wards. These wards were divided again in election districts which had their 
own leader as well. The local leaders of the wards and the election districts reported to the 
Assembly district. The Executive Committee answered to Kelly and they tried as best as they 
could to control the members of the basic unit of governance, namely Tammany Hall’s General 
Committee. Members of this Committee were chosen during party primary elections by 
enrolled Democrats. The individual wards formed the center of Tammany’s organizational 
strength. Local politics were the backbone of Tammany rule.18   
The district leaders received lists from the district captains which enlisted all the voters 
in their districts. This list entailed a report of the attitude of the voters towards Tammany, it told 
who were in trouble or in need and who and how they might be won over.19 The campaigns, 
the administration and the influence required money. The key supporters, however, weren’t in 
the position to financially support their political protectors. Therefore Kelly put in practice that 
“those who were given his blessing and Tammany’s nomination were expected to contribute a 
portion of their earnings to the organization’s campaign treasury”20. This system established a 
steady and systematic flow of money from officeholders and candidates. Plunkitt describes how 
the contributors were reminded of their payment: “No force, no threats – only a little shiverin’ 
which any man is liable to even in summer”21.  
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While Kelly was working to win back the power which was in the hands of the 
Republicans who dominated the state’s congressional caucus and controlled the state legislature, 
there was a discussion on the power of suffrage on a broader level. Even during the rule of 
“Boss” Tweed  there were reformers who aimed to “rescue democracy from the ignorant and 
the poor – people who had no appreciation of the burden of taxation”22. A better sort of person 
was supposed to be attracted to politics, more specifically a City Council should be established 
for men with property worth over $20,000. In 1877 a Republican majority saw problems in 
universal suffrage as well and proposed an amendment that would limit the popular vote to 
taxpayers with property “valued at more than $500 or who paid an annual rent of $250 or 
more”23.  
The main problem in New York City was, after all, that “the poor man’s vote counted 
the same as the rich man’s” 24 . This amendment would take away the votes of the chief 
supporters of Tammany. Therefore Tammany transformed the New York City legislative 
elections of 1877 into a partial referendum on the Tilden Commission, which established the 
amendment. Tammany succeeded since “for thousands of immigrants whose votes meant the 
difference between holding power and being powerless, Tammany was indistinguishable from 
government itself. For John Kelly, that association was a source of pride. For reformers, that 
was precisely the problem”25. Reformers generally gathered in civic organizations and they 
believed in a republic of disinterest, where the “best” people would rule and there would be no 
partisan politics.26 In Tammany they saw everything that they despised about partisan politics: 
“Tammany embraced transactional politics, the notion that voters – even those born elsewhere 
with only the vaguest understanding of American politics – had a keen sense of their own 
interest and would act accordingly”27.  
Another important aspect of Tammany’s way of gaining votes is their role as mediators 
or advocates in softening the blows for their constituents that might be caused by the free-
market economy. This led to a conflict with the hero of the reformers, Grover Cleveland. The 
men of Tammany made themselves available anytime of the day and functioned as informal 
job-placement centers. As Plunkitt describes the Tammany district leader: “He plays politics 
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every day and night in the year, and his headquarters bears the inscription, ‘Never closed’”28. 
The Tammany district leader was available day and night to help anyone in need, therefore 
everybody in the district knew him and came to him for assistance.29 Significant in their strong 
role in the society were the headquarters or clubhouses of Tammany, which were “never closed”. 
They provided the physical translation of the service of social welfare ideology of Tammany. 
The clubs functioned as a network to hold political power since they were part of a “well-
digested system of political tactics, emanating from a single point, and extending in circle upon 
circle, until it shall embrace the entire nation”30. They provided employment, entertainment, 
judicial review and most of all social services to those in need. Therefore they undermined the 
idea that the marketplace should be free of government involvement. They challenged the 
individualism and minimalist government ideal of the transatlantic Anglo-Protestant culture. 
The threat coming from Cleveland, on the other hand, was the threat of the merit system. This 
system meant that “patronage, that disreputable practice of using access to power as a means to 
provide work for political operatives and favors to constituents, would dry up”31.  
Kelly had saved and transformed Tammany. When he died, Richard Croker succeeded 
him. Croker installed allies in the government and he owned stock in companies that did 
business with the city. Therefore his personal fortunes grew and few would argue that Tammany 
was an ideal political organization under his rule. At the end of the nineteenth century the 
division between old native-stock Anglo-Saxon Protestants and immigrant-stock masses grew 
in New York. Even though Tammany didn’t have a broad solution for the inequality and poverty 
problems, it stood its ground on protecting the rights of the immigrants and their access to the 
ballot box. This included African-Americans. Contrary to their fellow Democrats in the South, 
Tammany’s Irish-American leaders were actively lobbying for their votes. Tammany desired 
to reach into the city’s black community, which was traditionally Republican.32   
Although Tammany under the rule of Croker wasn’t able to establish broad solutions 
for the Gilded Age New York poverty and exploitation, it did cultivate a new generation which 
was searching for solutions. At a time of tremendous demographic change in New York, 
Tammany organized community-building exercises which functioned as party-building events 
as well. “Tammany’s own brand of laissez-faire government, applied not to economics but to 
cultural policy, was born on the playing fields of College Point and other bucolic venues, where 
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the city’s ethnic and religious groups – white ethnic and religious groups, to be sure – learned 
to live and let live, and where they came to understand that the imposition of one group’s rules 
could infringe on the values of another group’s”33. This melting pot of voters and politicians 
with games faced a battle with a coalition of anti-Tammany forces. 
An investigation into the city’s underworld caused new doubts on the self-government 
capacity of the Irish. Richard Croker confronted an unrelenting attorney of the reform 
movement, Frank Moss, before he retired as Boss. During this confrontation, Moss asked 
Croker whether he was working his own pockets to which Croker responded with “All the time, 
same as you”. This became a “rallying cry for a generation of anti-Tammany candidates and 
advocates”34. On the other hand, the “same as you” part gave a “voice to the Irish community’s 
grievances and alienation”35. George W. Plunkitt supports this view of Croker on how politics 
work. Politics is viewed as a business, therefore honest graft was justified. Plunkitt argues that 
on the one hand there are political looters who are only considering themselves. On the other 
hand there are “practical” politicians who look after their own interests but the organization’s 
and the city’s interests at the same time. Honest graft simply means that a politician sees his 
opportunities.36 It becomes dishonest graft when rake-offs from prostitution and gambling are 
involved.37 As far as Plunkitt is concerned, “The Irish was born to rule, and they’re the honestest 
people in the world”38.  
However, after another “Tammany disaster born of greedy overreach and outright 
criminality”39, Richard Croker retired in 1902 and Charlie Murphy became the new leader of 
Tammany. He was the district leader of Manhattan’s Gas House District, which was an 
important neighborhood for the power and patronage of Tammany Hall. Murphy, nicknamed 
“Silent Charlie”, prized loyalty and discipline and was a professional politician.40 He would 
become a different Boss than his predecessors. He believed in a clean government where 
politics shouldn’t have anything to do with prostitution or gambling and outright bribery. 
Politicians shouldn’t interfere in the Police Department or the school system either. However, 
politics and patronage were a different story. Politically connected companies could still be 
awarded with contracts.41 
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During his time as Boss, Murphy faced a many attacks of reform groups, muckrakers 
and national figures like Franklin D. Roosevelt who organized themselves against Tammany 
Hall. Plunkitt describes them as:  “ mornin’ glories – looked lovely in the mornin’ and withered 
up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishin’ forever, like fine old oaks”42. 
According to him, reform movements always disappeared after a while, where the machine 
remained in power. The problem of the reform movement was that they did not understand the 
daily concerns of the voters. Tammany, on the other hand had leaders who were living with the 
people for whom they advocated and they knew exactly what was going on in their district. 
Moreover, “Murphy and individual members of  Tammany had been moving the organization 
toward the cause of reform – or, more to the point, to a new kind of reform shorn of its 
evangelical moralism”43. Without its evangelical elements, reform was redefined as a pragmatic 
form of liberalism. With new social legislation, New York became “a hothouse of progressive 
reform long before the New Deal”44. Tammany became a supporter of social-welfare and 
regulatory legislation. 
Murphy held on to the right to protect his friends in business and his power over the 
caucus and over Albany was enormous. Franklin D. Roosevelt called him a wise man since he 
got away with insisting that not the bosses but conventions chose candidates, “he kept his own 
counsel at key moments”45.  He did see the necessity for the party to adapt itself to its time: 
“Political parties could not remain static; they had to adapt or they died”46. He relied on men 
like Al Smith, Robert Wagner, Jeremiah Mahoney and James Foly to strengthen the 
commitment of Tammany to social reform. Al Smith and Robert Wagner advised him to 
endorse progressive reforms like maximum hours legislation and workmen’s compensation. 
They made him realize that they would otherwise lose the support of the working class.47 Both 
Al Smith and Robert Wagner would turn out to be important in future reform and legislation in 
the U.S.  
In 1917, Tammany and Murphy made a comeback in New York City politics.48 It didn’t 
end in the city government: “Not content with complete domination of the city offices, 
Tammany also was completely victorious in the contest for county post, according to early 
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returns”49. Murphy’s explanation for the victory was that Tammany was progressive and simply 
following world-wide progressive tendencies. Smith and Wagner established Tammany’s 
reform agenda, which focused on social-welfare and workplace-safety measures. They 
represented the new urban liberalism with reforms like pensions for struggling families and 
compensation for workers.  
Tammany figures were not just advocating for the poor and the downtrodden: “They 
were engaged in the lives of the people they represented. They understood their problems, in 
part because so many Tammany figures were not far removed from the experience of tenement 
life, the catastrophic loss of a parent (usually a father), and the sense of powerlessness that was 
partner to poverty”50. Therefore, Tammany men helped people in need, no questions asked 
whereas traditional reformers “immersed in Anglo- Protestant notions of worthiness rather than 
simple need, sought to change character and culture as part of a contract like relationship with 
the poor and distressed”51. To open-minded reformers supporters, like Francis Perkins “the 
result, not the process, was what mattered”52 . As Jeremiah Mahoney, one of Tammany’s 
politicians, insisted: “Tammany figures never forgot the struggles of their youth and that they 
had acted accordingly once they were in public life” 53 . Even though their methods were 
irregular, for reformers Tammany Hall under the rule of Charlie Murphy would turn out to be 
on the right side of history, something Franklin D. Roosevelt would recognize as well after 
initially fighting Tammany.54  
When Murphy died in 1924, Franklin D. Roosevelt, stated that “the New York City 
Democratic organization has lost probably the strongest and wisest leader it has had in 
generations”55. He appreciated Murphy’s efforts for reform: “It is well to remember that he has 
helped to accomplish much in the way of progressive legislation and social welfare in our 
state”56. Roosevelt built a coalition with Al Smith which would change “the very nature of U.S. 
politics”57. Al Smith brought elite progressives, prominent business leaders and labor activists 
together in the Reconstruction Commission which was asked to develop a more forceful and 
assertive role for state government. In this “better” government, democracy “does not merely 
mean periodic elections. It means a government held accountable to the people between 
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elections”58, according to the principles of the Commission. Smith’s “demands for efficiency 
led to a drastic reorganization of state government, including the elimination of redundant or 
overlapping agencies, centralization, and greater accountability. He considered administrative 
reorganization – a good government issue if ever there was one – to be his greatest achievement, 
and a model for the nation”59. 
Al Smith built a New Deal marriage between social-welfare reformers and machine 
politicians and thus bridged the cultural gap between them. He was of great importance for the 
rise of Roosevelt, with whom he would later on battle for the Democratic nomination for 
President. Roosevelt won and became President in 1932. Al Smith was “the symbol of tolerance 
in American life,” who caused a revolution: a revolution “that created a more pluralistic, activist 
political culture in New York; a revolution achieved under the auspices of the nation’s most 
famous political machine, Tammany Hall” 60 . However, he also had his apparently 
“unforgivable” association with Tammany Hall. Tammany was still seen as the institution 
“against which stand charged a century of corruption, misgovernment, and uncalled-for human 
misery in the city of New York”61. The downfall for Tammany power was in sight. 
Though the most important supporters for the machine and its Boss, immigrants also 
explain the decline in machine power. Over time the second- and third-generation immigrant 
children had other interests than their (grand-) parents. They were now part of the middle class, 
which entailed a growing interest for the public instead of the personal welfare. Therefore, they 
became reform-minded, vote-conscious and even anti-Boss. 62  On a national level, the 
Democratic party started to bear a resemblance to Tammany Hall. Urban bosses, who shared 
the urban liberal agenda of Al Smith, became important national players who represented the 
(grand-) children of immigrants. Still, after Murphy, Tammany was slowly losing its power: 
“Some of the city’s most prominent Irish politicians soon concluded that Tammany had outlived 
its usefulness – because, in the end, it had accomplished its mission”63. The immigrants were 
now integrated and part of the middle-class and Tammany Hall was slowly turning into the 
pages of history.  
With La Guardia as the new mayor of New York City in 1933, the end for Tammany 
Hall was near. The end of Tammany Hall wasn’t, however, the end of the use of  patronage in 
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(city) government. President Roosevelt used his friends, to hold a grip on New Deal patronage. 
An important one was Ed Flynn, boss of the Bronx and a protégé of Murphy. He wasn’t a 
Tammany member, but he was a machine politician and a true political fixer. He would continue 
to advice President Roosevelt on political intelligence and patronage. Patronage was critical for 
Tammany Hall and La Guardia used its tactics to build his own personal political machine and 
destroy Tammany.64  With La Guardia, the reformers found a candidate who could match 
Tammany Hall’s motto that “voters – even those who spoke little or no English, even those 
unfamiliar with the political traditions of the Pilgrim fathers – were capable of determining and 
acting in their own best interests”65.  
 
1.2. Machine politics 
Tammany Hall and its Bosses offer a good insight into the functioning of a political machine. 
This section will underline certain functions and aspects of the political machine in order to 
further clarify the ideology behind the political machine and specify the defenders of the spoils 
system arguments. The emergence of a political machine and its Boss can, according to Robert 
K. Merton, be explained by on the one hand a structural context, and on the other hand the 
functions of the machine for diverse groups.66 The structural context refers to the constitutional 
framework of the political organization in the United States. This framework limits the legal 
possibilities for a high centralized power. The check and balance system ought to prohibit any 
governmental institution from gaining too much power, by spreading out the power over several 
organic parts. This entails the local level of government as well. Merton argues that institutions 
therefore lack the adequate authority to act when positive action is demanded. Merton might be 
exaggerating on the lack of authority. Nonetheless in a check and balance system without a 
strong centralized power decision-making and implementation takes time. A lack of 
decisiveness can be interpreted as a lack of authority. The machine offers a more humanized 
system of partisan government, which aimed to avoid the government by law.67 The machine 
and more specifically the Boss with his central power, thus fills a gap in the political 
organization of the United States caused by the constitutional framework.  
The machine fulfills some underlying functions as well. The roots of the political 
machine lay in the local community. As the organization of Tammany illustrates, the local 
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politics were the backbone of Tammany’s rule with the individual wards as its main 
organizational strength.68 According to Richard C. Wade “it succeeded because it was rooted 
in the realities of block life – the clubhouse, the saloon, the cheap theaters, and the street”69. 
The Boss ran the machine from a saloon or a political club instead of a penthouse suite: “The 
machine was a coterie of powerful ward leaders who gave allegiance to the boss. Such leaders 
represented the grass-roots of urban politics, the neighborhood. They headed the most important 
social institution of the neighborhood, the political club, and most city bosses learned their trade 
by managing one”70.  
The political club functions as a social institution, where patronage was the main 
instrument for power. With the use of patronage, the Boss was able to control the party 
organization, several divisions of the municipal government, and in some cases even divisions 
in the county and state government. It was a system of reward and punishment, where jobs in 
the public or the party office were offered or denied in order to build a vast network of 
followers.71 The raison d’être of the machine, according to Frank Kent, is “placing just as much 
of his machine as he possibly can on the payroll”72. It is the reward for all the work the members 
put into the party and the elections. Plunkitt emphasizes the importance of patronage for 
maintaining support: “I acknowledge that you can’t keep an organization together without 
patronage. Men ain’t in politics for nothin’. They want to get somethin’ out of it”73.  
The local representatives of Tammany recognized the voters in the persons that were 
living in the neighborhood, who had personal needs and problems.74 The representatives of the 
machine fulfill a “social function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of assistance to 
those in need”75. This assistance can entail legal advice, jobs, food, helping young boys getting 
a scholarship to go to college and so on. In contrast to the existing institutions, for example 
welfare agencies and public relief departments, the Boss didn’t ask any questions and he didn’t 
interfere with private affairs. The precinct representative of the machine is viewed, by the 
community members,  as a friend and thus as “just one of us”. 76  
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The political machine provides in the needs of the American society. In the society, 
certain subgroups are excluded from the standard channels for personal development and are in 
need of alternative channels of social mobility. These subgroups don’t have the opportunity to 
achieve money and power, which are in the U.S. the cultural standards for success. The machine 
offers these alternative avenues to the disadvantaged. Immigrants for example, like the Irish in 
New York, “have had the greatest difficulty in finding places for themselves in our urban social 
and economic structure. Does anyone believe that the immigrants and their children could have 
achieved their present degree of social mobility without gaining control of the political 
organization of some of our largest cities?”77. The machine fulfills cultural needs for success of 
subgroups in the society by offering, namely money and power by offering them jobs. 
Tammany offered Irish immigrants government jobs in exchange for support. This provision of 
employment and social mobility established the “business nature of machine politics”78.  
The “business nature” of machine politics is also described by Alexander B. Callow Jr. 
He states that the machine can be seen as a business where the products are power and influence. 
The goal of the organization is to get votes and win elections with the consumers being voters 
and party-workers. It is a business of playing politics where the Boss functions as the political 
entrepreneur: “Like a corporation, his organization was hierarchical in structure, offering a 
variety of inducements material, psychological, social – but demanding as well discipline 
obedience, and loyalty”79. The important element is not merely providing aid, but it is the way 
in which the aid is provided. The machine and its representatives function as the “business 
community’s ambassador in the otherwise alien (and sometimes unfriendly) realm of 
government”80. Plunkitt describes this through a solemn contract between district leaders and 
politicians. A Tammany man needs to be faithful, pick up jobs for his followers and if he “shows 
himself in all ways a true statesman, then his followers are bound in honor to uphold him, just 
as they’re bound to uphold the Constitution of the United States”81. 
The Boss has business clients as well, to whom he offers economic services. After all, 
business clients have needs as well which aren’t provided through culturally appropriate 
conventional social structures. The Boss and his machine are well compensated with special 
privileges, which inevitably make them an integral part of the organization of the economy.82 
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Plunkitt explains that the private patronage in Tammany “keeps things going’ when it gets a 
setback at the polls”83. He sees himself as a business man and he goes in “for any business that’s 
profitable and honest”84. Merton states that besides the services the machine provides for the 
legitimate business, it provides services for the illegitimate business as well. It allows the 
machine to satisfy economic demands without the interference of the government. Like the 
function they fulfill in the legitimate business, the Boss and his machine function as “an 
effective liaison of ‘business’ with the government”85. The machine is able to help and integrate 
the different subgroups (business and criminal) of the society.86 As described earlier, Plunkitt 
makes a distinction between honest and dishonest graft. In his opinion, politicians are allowed 
to see their opportunities and take them. However, when for example blackmailing gambling 
and/or prostitution are involved, it is dishonest graft and politicians shouldn’t get involved.87  
Bosses are often portrayed as autocratic leaders with absolute power. However, they had 
to bargain for favors as well since they depended on different interests which were competing 
and shifted occasionally. It was a strategy of balance in which they had to deal with attacks 
from reformers as well. The main question was whether he could deliver as a leader, whether 
he was able to do anything for anybody.88 One of his jobs was to select candidates and therefore 
he had to rely on independent men: “how far he has to go in taking chances with independent 
men on the machine ticket depends upon the strength of his party in the city, the temper of the 
people, and the weight, disposition, and force of the newspapers”89. These elements determine 
the position of the machine and the extent of its power.  
According to Frank Kent, this selection of candidates by the machine Boss for the 
primary elections is essential for the existence of the political machine. He argues that in the 
American electoral system, the primaries are much more vital to the precinct executive than the 
general elections. Primaries, he claims, are viewed as merely a concern for politicians. 
Therefore “often an absurdly small proportion of the qualified voters participate in the 
primaries”90. A lack of clear understanding and perhaps a lack of active interest among the 
citizens prohibits them from participating. The lack of participation in the primaries enables the 
machine to run the country. With a general lack of voters in the primaries, the machine is able 
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control the situation through the precinct executives. Control of the primaries means control of 
which party candidates can pass on to the general elections. Therefore, they are able to “limit 
the choice of the voters in the general election to its choice in the primaries”91. In the political 
system as it exists in the U.S., parties are essential to the government and as long as the machine 
can nominate its candidates in the primaries, they can’t be beaten.92  
Machine men do vote, they will cast their organization ballots and the voters that they 
have influenced go to the polls as well: “voting is a business matter with them and they attend 
to it”93. More importantly, they vote in the primaries. For the machine, the primaries are thus 
the key instrument that gives them a legal status and enables them to keep control. “The basic 
truth is that the boss will go just as far in the patronage matter as he can – and the distance he 
can go is exactly measured by the indifference of the voters”94. Another important factor in the 
extent of power of the Boss and his machine are the newspapers. In New York there are multiple 
examples of newspapers that were strongly anti-Tammany. The so-called muckraking 
journalists had their crusades against members of Tammany and the machine as a whole. 
According to Plunkitt, the newspapers were supporting the reformers because Tammany didn’t 
care about the papers. They wanted to be let alone and attend their business quietly.95 The 
newspapers and their support for the reform movement will be further discussed in chapter 3.  
The opposition from the civil service reformers was a constant threat to Tammany Hall 
and its Bosses. Plunkitt describes that the civil service “monster” made his blood boil. Civil 
service reform is, in his opinion, a threat to patriotism, especially the patriotism of young boys 
who want to serve their country in a government job, but have to take a civil service examination 
first. When they fail this examination they lose their patriotism. This is a terrible thing for 
Tammany, as Plunkitt states: “Tammany’s the most patriotic organization on earth, 
notwithstandin’ the fact that the civil service law is sappin’ the foundations of patriotism all 
over the country”96. Plunkitt explains that a representative government insists on obeying the 
people’s voice, but the people knew what they were voting for when they voted for Tammany. 
Tammany never denied standing for the spoils system and rewarding the men who won the 
victory.97 
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Despite the strong opposition towards civil service reform, Tammany would eventually 
support and even introduce social reform at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the early 
nineteenth century the political organization in the U.S. was characterized by its elite-led 
structure. This changed as a result of the changing society: “Famine exiles helped to create a 
political culture that was more populist and more representative of the city, a culture personified 
by immigrant and immigrant-stock political figures who rose to prominence through Tammany 
in the Progressive Era and who helped pass groundbreaking social legislation that challenged 
and then defeated the laissez-faire approach used by British authorities while Ireland starved”98. 
The transatlantic Anglo-Protestant culture of rugged individualism and minimalist government 
was challenged by Tammany’s ways of winning votes.99  
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Chapter 2: Civil Service Reformers 
As the historical overview in the introduction illustrates the Pendleton Act, signed by President 
Arthur on January 16, 1883 introduced government jobs based on merit instead of political 
affiliation. Where the Pendleton Act eventually led to reform on a federal level, the local level 
held on to its own ways of governing for as long as possible. The previous chapter entailed a 
historical overview of Tammany Hall’s political machine in New York and how it functioned. 
As the chapter clarified, Tammany and its Bosses faced strong opposition from, inter alia, 
reformers. This chapter will further address the motives of the reformers and the ways in which 
they aimed to destroy the political machine and its patronage to replace it with the merit system.  
The specified arguments will be evaluated and compared to the defenders of the spoils system 
arguments in Chapter 3. This chapter will address the Pendleton act on a federal level and 
chronologically move towards the local level issues.  
The Pendleton Act was to “cure” a wide-spread evil. This evil defrauded the country in 
the collection of taxes, since no organization was save from corruption. The Pendleton Act 
focused on the spoils system. The spoils system caused tension among government workers as 
they could be removed from office at any time. This was interpreted as a healthy form of 
uneasiness which kept them motivated and active. “Strong national feeling did not permeate 
the American civil service prior to 1883. A civil servant was loyal primarily to his patron‒ the 
local politician who procured him his job”1. Civil servants were even granted paid leaves to 
campaign in their home districts, which was vital for maintaining their job.  
In the eyes of the civil service reformers, the spoils system had brought the civil service 
into disgrace. Since the service was overshadowed by spoils politicians, they therefore focused 
their frustration on the spoils system.2  Carl Schurz, one of his age’s greatest reformers, claims 
that the introduction of the spoils element in the Federal service can be seen as one of the 
principal sources of demoralization in political life.3 This demoralization of political life refers 
to the presidential selection, which, according to Schurz, is in the hands of Senators and 
Members of Congress. He comments about the spoils system: “The fact remains that, when 
persons are put into office for reasons other than their fitness for the duties to be performed, the 
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aggregate result will inevitably be a demoralized, wasteful and inefficient service” 4 . An 
important element of the spoils system is that spoils hunters are never satisfied. They will 
continue to demand jobs as long as they can.5  
Signing the Pendleton Act required a change from the spoils system in the civil service 
towards a merit system or classified system. This required civil service based on competitive 
examinations. With the Pendleton Act the number of civil service members under the merit 
system grew from 11 percent in 1883 to 46 percent in 1900.6 However, a more skeptical note 
is in place here, since the Pendleton Act was only the beginning. The transformation towards a 
merit system didn’t happen overnight and not without a struggle. As a Secretary of the Interior 
Carl Schurz had experience in the field of government and he appreciated the practical value of 
the merit system but he also saw the difficulties which were obstructing the full development 
of that system.7 He was convinced that the only real difficulty which was standing in the way 
of a full development of the merit system in the public service was “the pressure of political 
influence for patronage, and the lack of resisting power among appointing officers to stand firm 
against that pressure”8.  
The first step for President Arthur after signing the Act was to select commissioners to 
implement the standards in the Pendleton Act, commissioners who would be accepted by both 
the reformers and the politicians.9 The Civil Service Commission was supposed to preside over 
the merit system.10 The Pendleton Act required that this Commission consist of three people, 
of whom no more than two ought to be adherents of the same political party.11 As the New York 
Times reports on February 21st, 1883: “The manifold sheet that was spread out on Mr. David 
Davis’s desk, and was eagerly examined by half a dozen Senators, contained the names of Mr. 
Dorman B. Eaton, of New- York; Mr. John M. Gregory, of Illinois, and Mr. Leroy D. Thoman, 
of Ohio, to be Civil Service Commissioners”12 . Eaton and Gregory were the Republican 
nominations, Thoman was a member of the Democratic party. According to the New York Times, 
Thoman held “a prominent position as one of the young leaders of the Democratic Party in 
Ohio”13. He was able to ignore party claims when they interfered with public policy and a 
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personal and political friend of Pendleton. This was important, since the Democratic member 
of the commission ought to be in favor of the Pendleton Act as well. 
Under the leadership of Eaton, the Commission was cautious but firm. 14  The 
commission came up with a set of rules to govern the service in accordance with the 
specifications of the Pendleton Act.15 These rules underwent constant modification during the 
first few years. For every three steps the reformers gained, the spoils-men made them take two 
steps backward by fighting the changes.16 Still, “in spite of the many problems, the Commission 
did not confine its activities to the mere administration of the law. From the beginning it adopted 
a policy of publicity and propaganda”17. Their aim was to inform the public and to keep its 
opinion in favor of the merit system where possible.18 The authority of the Commission and its 
power grew between 1883 and 1900.19 This growing power changed the government service 
more and more into a career service. Civil servants were better educated and rendered a higher 
status in society.20 It became a profession with increased job security because of the regulation 
of appointments and restrictions on political removals.21   
Another institution concerned with the civil service was the National Civil Service  
Reform League (NCSRL). Carl Schurz describes the functions of this institution in the 
following words: “The National Civil Service Reform League was founded to discuss the 
subject of civil service reform to the end of winning for it the support of public opinion; to 
promote the enactment of reform legislation by Congress, by the State legislatures and by 
municipal governments, and finally to watch the enforcement of civil service laws and to keep 
the public truthfully informed thereon”22. In order to fulfill these duties, the NCSRL ought to 
be a non-partisan body.23 In a period from 1889–1891, a special commission of the National 
Civil Service Reform League investigated the situation of the civil service. In one of these 
reports the members state that “undoubtedly, the worst effects of the patronage system of 
appointments are apparent in the city of New York”24. The commission was concerned about 
the civil service on a local level as well. For example, in 1912, the National Civil service reform 
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League established a draft of a civil service law for cities. This draft is a form to apply the civil 
service law to a city in order to extend the merit system in state and municipal government.25 
Establishing influence and introducing the merit system, however, were more difficult on the 
local level than on the federal level. Where the commission’s investigations were successful in 
for example departments in Washington, it found violations of the rules by some local offices. 
The commission was unable to establish cooperation and therefore they were unable to properly 
investigate the local offices.26  The municipal level of government was important, since “city 
hall represents the government closest to the people. Local government is the testing ground for 
self-government”27. When it comes to the municipal government, the laws are diverse. States 
have their own system of laws for governing the cities, but there is little uniformity in municipal 
arrangements within a State.28   
A foundational document for the elite urban reformers was the book American 
Commonwealth.29  Most important for them in this document was the following sentence: 
“There is no denying that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United 
States”30. In the American Commonwealth Volume II, James Bryce addresses the problems that 
haunted the great cities’ administrations, like extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement. 
He categorizes different sorts of citizens. There are the immigrants who are ignorant and 
untrained in self-government31; voters who are not paying direct taxes and thus have no interest 
in taxation and economical administration; and able citizens who are absorbed in their private 
businesses and unwilling to spend their time and comfort in the political struggle. There are 
mechanical flaws in the structure of municipal governments, which lead to the hegemony of the 
spoils system and municipal misgovernment.32 In American city government “no officer by 
himself should have power enough to do much harm. The natural result of this was to create a 
situation where no officer had power to do much good”33. Bryce emphasizes “the justice of the 
American view that it is a dangerous thing, in wholly democratic communities, to make the 
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legislative body supreme over the executive”34. In order to establish enough power to actually 
do much good, as Bryce states, the reformers aimed to install a more centralized power in the 
municipal government.  
Bryce argues that it is easy to trace the sources of municipal misgovernment: the difficult 
part is to show what the remedies are for these sources. One of the remedies for city government 
Bryce refers to is civil service reform: “the establishment of examinations as a test for admission 
to posts under the city, and the bestowal of these posts for a fixed term of years, or generally 
during good behavior, instead of leaving the civil servant at the mercy of a partisan chief, who 
may displace him to make room for a party adherent or personal friend”35.  A civil service 
reform meant destroying the prevailing political machine headed by the Bosses. In order to 
succeed, civil service reformers and other opposition groups cooperated. This was also the case 
in New York, where the Bosses of Tammany Hall continuously faced opposition from 
cooperating reformers. As Callow explains, reformers found common ground in their goals and 
in their common enemy, namely the boss and his machine.36  
The anti-Tammany critics who were part of the reform movement included middle-class 
professionals who already had access to votes but were unlikely to gain a government job as a 
reward: “It was the transactional nature of Tammany politics – in which the right to vote became, 
in part, a means to an end rather than an exercise in civic virtue – that appalled reformers and 
spurred them to embrace civil-service reform as a way to limit the power of political parties 
over government hiring” 37 . Tammany Hall symbolized for them irredeemably evil 
government.38 Where Tammany was giving jobs to immigrants and bailing drunkards out of 
jail, the reformers were the moral, humane, delicately reared peace lovers.39  
Even though reformers had the common denominator of desiring to destroy the boss and 
his machine, there were contradictions in ideology and tactics. Melvin Holli makes the 
distinction between social and structural reformers. The social reformers held big business, with 
its special privileges, responsible for the corrupted municipal government.40 Social reformers 
were characterized by their humanistic and empirical tone. Their objective was to lower the 
consumer utility rates and place a larger part of the municipal tax burden on large 
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corporations.41 Social reformers were more humane, practical and more concerned with people 
than structural reformers.42 However, in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century the 
structural reformers prevailed, especially in the larger cities, over social reformers. Holli defines 
structural reform as “the effort to change the structure of municipal government, to eliminate 
petty crime and vice, and to introduce the business system of the contemporary corporation into 
municipal government”43.The structural reformers believed in a government which served the 
“rights” of the people. With “the people” they referred to the middle and patrician classes; the 
working class was viewed as the “other half”. They were business-oriented and aimed for 
structural reform with a centralized political power. Structural reform “was the effort to change 
the structure of municipal government, to eliminate petty crime and vice, and to introduce the 
business system of the contemporary corporation into municipal government”44. Especially 
introducing businesslike efficiency was an important element for the structural reformers.  
The structural reformers drew their ideas from a diverse group of theorists, which 
included college professors, good government people, representatives of the taxpayers 
associations and representatives for the business community.45 One of these theorists was James 
Bryce, who argued for a leading role by the upper class:  “In America, as everywhere else in 
the world, the commonwealth suffers more often from apathy or shortsightedness in the upper 
classes, who ought to lead, than from ignorance or recklessness in the humbler classes, who are 
generally ready to follow when they are wisely and patriotically led”46. Partisanship should be 
replaced with efficiency, honesty, and business methods. The Union League defined the 
government of a city as a matter of business instead of statesmanship: “The party system led 
only to lawlessness, disorganization, pillage and anarchy”47. For the reformers the key to cure 
corruption was to bring the “best people” back into the government. These “best people” were 
men with education, virtue, and substantial wealth.48 This was the elitist tone of the reformers. 
Central to the ideas of the structural reformers was the immigrant whom they 
categorized together with the urban lower class. These newcomers knew nothing about methods 
of free government. There was a significant distrust and lack of faith in the self-government 
capabilities of the urban class. The educated, upper-class Americans ought to rule the municipal 
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government with middle-class and patrician ideals which they imposed on the urban masses.49 
Universal suffrage, which was the source of power for the Boss and his machine, was therefore 
a problem. The reformers saw two cures for this evil. First of all universal suffrage should be 
limited, since those who have a stake in society should be the ones ruling it. Secondly, the 
municipality should be cleared from political influence and become a business.50 Smaller city- 
and elective councils should prevent the “unworthy” from being elected. They had to be 
governed by the “best people”.51 Callow addresses the irony in the aim to curtail the liberties 
of others by those who feel that their own civil liberties are endangered.52  The structural 
reformers embraced a strong mayoral and civil-service system. This system would create a 
supportive and technical staff and “make it possible for the business and professional classes of 
the community to assume the care of public business without making too great personal 
sacrifices”53. After all “the business of city government was business and not politics”54.  
In order to destroy the political machine, Bryce addresses the importance of the 
primaries. He explains that there is a group of men who aren’t joining the primaries since they 
are busy with their companies for example. If they came to the primaries, “They recognize by 
sight few of the persons present, for, in a city, acquaintance does not go by proximity of 
residence, and are therefore at a disadvantage for combined action, whereas the professional 
politicians are a regiment where every private in each company knows his fellow-private and 
obeys the officers”55. According to Callow, the “average” reformer in New York in the Tweed 
Era had middle- and upper-class sensibilities which clashed with the often rough, dreary, but 
necessary work of the primaries. They preferred ideals and principles56. Bryce emphasizes the 
importance of reforming the machine and securing the freedom of the voter and he names 
several legislative remedies: “election laws, new provisions against corruption, a reconstruction 
of the frame of city government, and a purification of the civil service, there are certain internal 
and, so to speak, natural causes of mischief, the removal of which will need patience and 
unremitting diligence”57. 
A role-model of structural reform was the New York mayor William F. Havemeyer. He 
was elected mayor in 1872 during the downfall of the Tweed Ring. He was so obsessed with an 
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economical, efficient, and honest government that he couldn’t establish anything of lasting 
importance: “The mayor’s death in 1874 mercifully ended the agony of a reform administration 
which was strangling the city with red tape generated by its own economy programs”58. A bit 
more successful was Seth Low as a mayor of New York City from 1902-1903. His solution for 
the municipal problems involved nonpartisanship and a centralized administration in municipal 
government. He established inter alia a reduction of the city’s debt and a tighter tax system.59  
In 1897, Carl Schurz argued with some other leading civil service reformers against a 
Civil Service bill which would bring back the partisanship of the spoils system. He refers to the 
Constitution of the State of New York: “Appointments and promotions in the civil service of 
the State, and of all the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made 
according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained, so far as practicable, by examinations, which, 
so far as practicable, shall be competitive” 60. However, Schurz recognizes the difficulty in New 
York for the reformers: “Even in the City of New York, where the sinister genius of Tammany 
Hall devotes itself with the accustomed zest and skill to the task of circumventing the civil 
service law, and where the local Civil Service Reform Association cooperating with the State 
authorities has to fight over every foot of ground, many valuable successes have been scored – 
at least in crossing iniquitous schemes and in making the ways of the transgressor duly hard”61. 
Lupsha explains the ways in which the reformers aimed to change the municipal 
government: “One of the reformers’ first goals was to take partisan politics out of city hall”62 
The tool they used to fulfill this goal was the non-partisan election where a candidate should 
stand on his own merits, not for a party. They aimed for the at-large election which included a 
responsibility of office holders towards a general electorate which covered the entire city, not 
the districts or wards. The reformers also wanted to separate policy-formation from policy-
administration in order to bring more checks and balances into the system. In order to establish 
this a council-manager system would be installed with a city manager.63 With this strategy they 
aimed to change the political system: “The reform ethic with its emphasis on professionalism, 
efficiency and rationality, assisted by the rising social welfare movement, undercut the 
machine’s ability to reward the faithful”64. 
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Even though the reform movement had some success, the reformers had quite a few 
problems with actually replacing the political machine. While the machine offered material and 
psychological inducements the reformers offered ideological inducements and they ran their 
organization based on volunteers. The “reformer failed to establish a permanent organization 
based upon the political skills necessary to survive the moral trauma of winning one election 
after another”65. It is difficult to keep ideological fires lighted to establish the amount of 
commitment which is necessary to win in urban politics. “The very lack of ideological 
commitment allowed the boss flexibility, room for maneuvering, compromise, and bargaining 
– the instrument of managing conflict. But only a cad compromises his ‘principles’; indeed, 
how do you bargain with ‘values’?”66. Ideology was a difficult subject for the reformers, since 
the coalition of reformers included different ideologies.  
Also reformers were not neighborhood people and as Moynihan explained “urban 
politics is a neighborhood business”67. The problem was that the reformers were so optimistic 
about the “old days” that they were blinded to the realities of the growing society. They 
continued to alienate the immigrant newcomer. Even though they were successful in defeating 
Tweed and his Ring, they were unable to defeat the machine.68 The reformer “never understood 
the politicians who made politics their business, their appeal to the masses, their attention to the 
plight of the immigrant, nor, indeed, the kind of world they were living in”69. 
In 1900 reformers were inspired by the commission system of government. This entailed 
a commission of five successful businessmen who would manage the city’s reconstruction when 
the regular government was unable to do so. Four of the members would manage a specific area 
of city government and the fifth functioned as a quasi-mayor. The city council was a success, 
until its popularity declined in 1917. On the one hand the system didn’t increase the efficiency 
enough and it didn’t eliminate politics. On the other hand the requirements in state constitutions 
that cities ought to be represented by mayors and councils caused too many obstructions.70 In 
the meantime another system came up, namely the city manager. This grew to be a great success 
on the local level between 1918 and 1960.The city manager was the alternative for the city boss 
and his plan usually entailed civil service reform as well. It was the reformers’ way of getting 
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businessmen and representatives of business on a large scale into public office.71 They took 
politics out of politics: “It was the triumph of the expert-technician over the city boss, 
administrator over district the leader, nonpartisanship over partisanship, efficiency over waste; 
honesty, impartiality, and the public interest, over graft, patronage, and ethnic lower-class 
recognition”72. The system tended to produce men who sought efficiency in government, not in 
human relations.  It is, however, the question whether the city manager did replace the boss and 
his machine. According to Callow the city manager system worked in smaller and middle-sized 
cities. The majority of the cities eventually adopted the election at-large system. This entailed 
a reduced representation from lower-class and working groups.73 
According to Hoogenboom, the Pendleton Act did, however, have its influence in 
limiting the power of the political Boss: “Civil servants, no longer obligated to a political boss 
and relatively secure under the merit system, devoted less time to local politics and more time 
to their duties than they had under the spoils system”74. The power of the local politicians came 
into the hands of people representing the merit system. Civil servants under the merit system 
“began to substitute loyalty to a national agency or office, which of course had a nationalizing 
effect”75. The civil service went through a transition towards political neutrality. McCarthy 
emphasizes the role of the middle class in this transition: “All the differences of interpretation 
in the literature of municipal reform notwithstanding, historians agree on the importance of the 
middle classes in organizing and supporting reform battles against machine politics”76.  
Nonetheless, partisanship remained, which was profitable for businessmen. Efficiency 
was an important element in the “new” civil service. In this more “efficient” civil service 
businessmen supplied money and were therefore able to dictate policy. The businessman 
became more important and even replaced the political boss on a local level: “The independent, 
capricious boss of the 1870’s was replaced in the 1890’s by the quiet, steady boss attentive to 
the interests of businessmen”77. The influence and ideals of the businessman replaced those of 
the politician. Gradually the civil service was transformed like the larger social order. The 
professionalization, development of a national feeling and the power of the businessmen in the 
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civil service were a reflection of the changes in American society.78 As Callow states: “urban 
reform was diverse, reflecting the rich pluralism of American society”79.
                                                          
78 Ibid., 318. 
79 Callow, The City Boss in America: An interpretive reader, 176. 
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Chapter 3: Evaluation 
According to democratic principles, a chosen government should implement the desires and 
demands of the voters with the help of bureaucrats. In a spoils system, political power has the 
authority to replace civil servants at will. In a merit system a certain competency test is required 
and government jobs are based on merit instead of political affiliation. Both systems have 
defenders claiming democratic legitimacy. Rosanvallon argues that a legitimate democracy 
includes three forms of legitimacy: impartiality, reflexivity and proximity. Rosanvallon’s 
definition of a legitimate democracy offers a framework to evaluate the ideas and attitudes of 
Tammany Hall and the civil service reformers and see who achieves democratic legitimacy best. 
This chapter will evaluate the democratic legitimacy of Tammany Hall and the civil service 
reformers based on Rosanvallon’s three forms of legitimacy.  
The center of the political machine was the local community. The machine functioned 
thanks to the spoils system and the local neighborhoods in which the political club was a social 
institution providing for the people through patronage. Tammany Hall grew with the support of 
immigrants and it took care of those who didn’t have access to, and did not know, the standard 
institutions and channels of social services and mobility. Contrary to these institutions, the 
machine didn’t ask questions while providing aid. Tammany knew exactly what was going on 
in the districts and a large group of Irish immigrants was able to identify with the Irish leaders 
of Tammany. This was important during elections since citizens are likely to cast their votes on 
candidates they can identify with. A good relationship between citizens and leaders leads to 
proximity, which is a form legitimacy according to Rosanvallon. For political machines like 
Tammany Hall, proximity was one of the main sources of legitimacy. It brought politics to the 
people. Especially the attention for particularity was essential in the daily business of Tammany 
Hall. As Rosanvallon argues, it is important for individuals that authorities are attentive, 
respectful, and offer them not only services but also a certain “status”. As representatives of the 
people, Tammany politicians were indeed offering security to those in society who were 
otherwise neglected by the state and state institutions. The spoils system enabled the political 
machine to offer security and a certain “status” to individuals which, in turn, made Tammany 
legitimate. In the absence of state institutions and state services it took care of citizens.  
The machine viewed itself also as the impartial institution that could mediate between 
political and commercial interests, with all of the consequences entailed.1 The way in which the 
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aid was provided to these business interests raises questions about Tammany’s claim on 
impartial legitimacy. The machine stepped in when it felt it was necessary; it was the result that 
mattered, not the process. The local political machine functioned as a business and it was able 
to do so because of the spoils system. Its goal was to win elections; the voters and party-workers 
were in a way its consumers. Members were rewarded for their support and hard work with 
government jobs. As Plunkitt stated, men wanted to get something out of being in politics. Thus 
machine leaders created their own private interests. But the Bosses and other powerful members 
of Tammany Hall had business clients in the private sector as well. In exchange for private 
compensation, the business clients were helped with certain privileges—or simply 
administrative services (permits for instance). According to Plunkitt, this private patronage kept 
things going and Tammany men would go for any business that was profitable and honest. He 
claimed that members of Tammany Hall simply saw their opportunities and therefore practiced 
honest graft. As the representative power Tammany was attentive, and gave a voice, to those 
otherwise neglected (or forgotten) in society—regular people as well as businessmen. However, 
in the spoils system the distinction between political power and government institutions was 
blurred: private and public interests were intertwined. Partisanship and personal interests were 
involved and they influenced the functioning of the system. In such a system it was undesirable, 
not to say impossible, for a political machine to function as an impartial mediator between 
citizens and the government. Tammany’s own interests were involved and it could therefore 
not be defined as an impartial institution.  
The civil service reformers saw the merit system as a legitimate alternative for the spoils 
system. In contrast to the spoils system, the merit system would offer a more impartial way of 
selecting civil servants. In order to obtain a government job, a competency test was required. 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the civil service reformers cooperated with other 
reform groups to defeat their common enemy, the political machine and the spoils system, 
despite different ideological backgrounds. The structural reformers believed in a government 
serving the right of the middle and patrician class, establishing business-oriented reform, and 
centralizing political power that replaced partisanship by efficiency, honesty and business 
methods. Lincoln Steffens questioned the legitimacy of these “honest” business methods. He 
argued that a typical big-businessman was a source of corruption since he only aimed to attend 
his own business. The people should therefore rely on a politician, not a businessman: “If I 
could—and I will some day—I should show that one of the surest hopes we have is the politician 
himself. Ask him for good politics; punish him when he gives bad, and reward him when he 
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gives good; make politics pay.”2 The business model of the reformers had the same kind of 
problems as the machine system it attacked. Nonetheless, with a competency test for 
government jobs and by removing partisanship the reformer’s claim of impartial legitimacy can 
be justified. 
However, when it comes to legitimacy in the form of proximity, reformers lacked the 
attentiveness to voters which representation requires. The reformers didn’t pay attention to 
particularity and inclusiveness. As mentioned before, Tammany helped people in need, no 
questions asked. Traditional reformers, on the other hand, asked questions of worthiness. Their 
definition of citizenship and an honest voter included, next to fair tests of citizenship, a certain 
level of intelligence. Structural reformers had a significant distrust in the self-governing 
capacities of the urban lower class. Their objective with the merit system was therefore to install 
an elitist form of government in which only the “best” people would be able to obtain 
government jobs.3 Such an elitist form of government curtailed the liberties of the urban lower 
classes of society. As supporters of the spoils system argued, the merit system would be 
destructive of patriotism: of civic involvement and engagement. Civic involvement and 
participation are essential elements of proximity. This wasn’t available to every individual: only 
an “elite” part of society was able to participate in government jobs. The reformers, therefore, 
can’t claim the “proximity” form of legitimacy as defined by Rosanvallon.  
While the spoils system can claim legitimacy in the form of proximity, it lacks impartial 
legitimacy. The merit system offers impartial legitimacy, but it lacks proximity. A third form 
of legitimacy which Rosanvallon discusses is reflexivity. As Rosanvallon argues, in a 
democracy there needs to be a certain element of distrust. Distrust can lead to “counter-
democratic” actions, for example a form of oversight such as a “journalist credo.” For citizens, 
journalists fulfill a reflexive function by offering insight into the government and its functioning. 
It might even be seen as an extension of the representative system in which the newspapers are 
reflecting and represent the will of the people. In the debate between the defenders of the spoils 
system and the civil service reformers journalists mainly reviewed the issues representing a lack 
of legitimacy. In the case of the political machine this involved a lack of impartiality, 
represented for instance by the political machine’s corruption. In the case of the civil service 
reformers it involved a lack of proximity because of their “elitist” objectives. As representatives 
of reflexive institutions, journalists were translating the political world for the citizens and they 
established a certain level of influence. For instance, the most convincing opposition against 
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Boss Tweed and his inner circle, better known as “the Ring”, came from several newspapers. 
With their crusade against Boss Tweed so-called muckraking journalists formed an important 
enemy for Tammany Hall. In the case of Boss Tweed the opposition from inter alia the New 
York Times and the cartoonist Thomas Nast from Harper’s Weekly would eventually lead to his 
downfall. This makes it interesting to further discuss how these newspapers and periodicals 
fulfilled their duties as reflexive institutions and how they managed to establish such a level of 
influence that they were able to bring down a Tammany Boss.  
With his cartoons of Tweed and his Ring, Thomas Nast became the most important 
political cartoonist in America in 1872.4 He was a critic of Boss Tweed and Tammany Hall, but 
he was skeptical about civil service reformers such as Carl Schurz as well. Another important 
reformer, Senator Charles Sumner, who introduced the bill in 1864 that would start the 
campaign for competitive examinations in the government, was depicted by Nast as “a man 
who believed in his own genius and relied on his power and reputation but utterly lacked 
humility”5. Nast’s depiction of Sumner wasn’t appreciated by George William Curtis, who as 
the periodical’s editor established Harpers Weekly’s political stance. He was a reform-minded 
Republican and friends with Sumner.6 The Advance described Curtis as being “consecrated to 
the highest ideals and practical aims of true citizenship.”7 More importantly he found the 
aggressive nature of Nast’s cartoons distasteful and he saw that they harmed the civil service 
reform that he supported. Nast on the other hand cared more about supporting the president 
(Grant) than civil service reform.8 Nast had a strong commitment to the ideals of the American 
Dream and “throughout his career, he championed suffrage as both a right and a 
responsibility.”9 Instead of supporting a campaign for reform, Nast created “a campaign against 
the abuse of public trust.”10 This campaign included illustrations depicting the city boss as 
emblems of evil. The voters of Tweed were, most of the time, unable to read but Nast’s cartoons 
were very clear to them.11 Tweed understood Nast’s influence on public opinion and tried, 
unsuccessfully, to bribe him into leaving the country in 1871.12 Nast reflected on both the 
defenders of the spoils system and the civil service reformers. In what can be seen as civic 
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engagement and civic duty, he “reflected” on political power. Even though Curtis didn’t agree 
with him, he used his cartoons to express his own political preferences. 
Including personal political preferences during reflexive duties is a typical characteristic 
of so-called muckraking journalists. Muckraking journalists are known for their crusade against 
Boss Tweed and “the Ring”. The New York Times and its muckraking journalistic crusade 
against Tammany Hall and its corruption are a good example. In 1870, the newspaper described 
the mission of the Democratic party as an effort to steal political power from the many and 
place it in the hands of a few; in the hands of Boss Tweed and “the Ring.” The Times claimed 
that a Democrat couldn’t get elected or even appointed to an office in government without the 
consent of Boss Tweed or another member of “the Ring.” Besides ruling the Democratic party, 
Boss Tweed and his Ring dominated the municipal government as well. According to the Times 
the Ring “acknowledges no responsibility to the people, but is entirely above and beyond the 
people.”13 The Tweed Ring was far from transparent and citizens had no knowledge of how 
their tax money was spent, according to the Times.14  The New York Times had a clear opinion 
about the political machine and its Boss: according to the Times all Democrats were corrupt.15 
Another influential muckraking journalists, Lincoln Steffens criticized the political 
machine as well. He visited several cities and commented on the functioning of their municipal 
government in The Shame of the Cities in 1904. He describes the Boss as a corrupt bribe-giver 
who changes his party in order to gain power.16 Steffens sees the political machine as the “bad” 
government and he wants to replace it with a good one. The accusations by the Times and other 
muckraking journalists threatened the legitimacy of Tammany Hall. The accusations raised 
doubts on the good relationship between the political machine and the citizens; they questioned 
the element of “proximity” of the system. 
In its reflexive role, the media reviewed the government’s functioning and the political 
debate between defenders of the spoils system and civil service reformers. However, as the 
examples of Thomas Nast and the muckraking journalists illustrate, newspapers were far from 
independent and objective and they integrated their political preferences in their work. With 
their political affiliations the newspapers endangered their reflexive function and therefore the 
legitimacy of the democracy. However, newspapers reflect on one another as well. Where the 
New York Times attacked Tammany Hall, The New York Sun and the Evening Post attacked the 
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Times for its accusations against Tweed and the Ring.17 However, the divided political sphere 
increased the media’s legitimacy: as Rosanvallon remarks, “The more divided the partisan 
political sphere appears, the greater the legitimacy of a reflexive institution intervening in 
controversial issues”18.  
Both the defenders of the spoils system and the civil service reformers had supporters 
and critics in the media to influence public opinion. Eventually the people and their civic 
engagement decide whether they act in accordance with the reflections offered by the media 
during elections. Therefore, the role of elections needs to be taken into account as well. 
Elections are perceived to be the foundation of a legitimate democracy: a democracy is a 
representation of the people and the people choose their representatives through elections. 
Elections were essential to the success of the political machine since representatives gained 
control over government jobs in the spoils system: “To the victors belong the spoils.”19 In order 
to change the spoils system and introduce the merit system, it was necessary for reformers to 
win elections. However, they repeatedly failed to successfully replace the political machine of 
Tammany Hall with a permanent organization which had the political skills to win elections on 
a regular basis. Lincoln Steffens therefore questions in The shame of the Cities whether citizens 
wanted the government to change: “But do the people want good government? Tammany says 
they don’t. Are the people honest? Are the people better than Tammany? Are they better than 
the merchant and the politician? Isn’t our corrupt government, after all, representative?”20 He 
states that “we”‒the American people‒are responsible for letting the leaders “divert our loyalty 
from the United States to some ‘party’; we let them boss the party and turn our municipal 
democracies into autocracies and our republican nation into a plutocracy.”21 Steffens blames 
the American people for installing the Boss and therefore installing a “bad” government:  “The 
boss is not a political, he is an American institution, the product of a freed people that have not 
the spirit to be free.”22 
Steffens has a point. Public opinion has to favor change in order to establish it. The 
alternative has to appear better to the people than the current situation. Sociologist Robert 
Merton explains that “any attempt to eliminate an existing social structure without providing 
adequate alternative structures for fulfilling the functions previously fulfilled by the abolished 
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organization is doomed to failure.”23 A reform has to satisfy the existing needs by alternative 
structures and therefore it needs a “re-forming” of the political and social structure as well. The 
machine fulfills a certain need which doesn’t simply disappear with the destruction of machine 
politics.24  
Steffens describes the standard course of municipal reform in which the corrupt machine 
runs things until the corruption becomes a scandal: “Then the reformers combine the opposition: 
the corrupt and unsatisfied minority, the disgruntled groups of the majority, the reform 
organizations; they nominate a mixed ticket, headed by a ‘good business man’ for mayor, make 
a ‘hot campaign’ against the government with ‘Stop, thief!’ for the cry, and make a ‘clean 
sweep.’”25 However, soon enough the business mayor would turn out not to be functioning the 
way he was supposed to and the ‘politicians’ would come back to take over. That is why La 
Guardia, for example, was successful in 1903. He installed his own personal political machine 
to fill the gap otherwise filled by Tammany Hall:  “La Guardia and Pingree relied on a political 
base composed of the lower working classes and immigrant groups; similarities with the 
traditional political machine here are unmistakable.” 26  As Theodore J. Lowi emphasizes, 
reform in New York meant replacing “Old” Machines with “New” Machines: “the destruction 
of the machine did not, in New York or elsewhere, eliminate the need for political power.”27 
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Conclusion 
This thesis offers an evaluation of the debate between defenders of the spoils system (Tammany 
Hall) and defenders of the merit system (civil service reformers) in New York at the end of the 
19th century. The debate between Tammany Hall and civil service reformers entailed more than 
merely corruption and civil service reform, the conflict was multi-layered: “The conflict 
between reformers and Tammany politicians during the Gilded Age was not simply a battle 
between the advocates of good government and the forces of corruption. It was “at its most 
elemental level, a fight over the meaning of democracy and tolerance in a rapidly changing city, 
an ideological struggle over the role of government in a modern industrial life, and a debate 
over the very construction of Americanism in a cosmopolitan, global city”1. The debate is 
therefore evaluated with a theoretical framework on democratic legitimacy set by Pierre 
Rosanvallon.  
Both the defenders of the spoils system as the civil service reformers believed their 
political system to be legitimate and democratic. Both the defenders of the spoils system as the 
civil service reformers had persuasive arguments for a claim on legitimate power. The 
evaluation shows that the three forms of legitimacy set by Rosanvallon‒proximity, impartiality, 
and reflexivity‒are intertwined and it is difficult to evaluate one without the other ones. Where 
the merit system and the corresponding competency tests created legitimacy through 
impartiality, the spoils system established legitimacy through proximity. However, corruption 
and “elitist” objectives damaged the level of legitimacy in both systems. Therefore it can be 
concluded that neither the political machine and the spoils system nor the civil service reformers 
and the merit system were functioning perfectly legitimate in accordance with the theory set by 
Rosanvallon.  
Proximity, impartiality and reflexivity are additional forms of legitimacy since mere 
elections are, according to Rosanvallon, no longer sufficient. Nonetheless, as this evaluation 
argues, elections remain the foundational measurement of legitimacy. In order to maintain or 
gain power, political powers transform in accordance with societal changes. As the overview 
shows, Tammany Hall transformed under Murphy at the beginning of the 20th Century, to a 
certain extent, into a reform movement since it was in line with the public opinion. The key to 
success for the civil service reformers was a “new” political machine to replace the “old” 
political machine of Tammany Hall. The need for a political machine remained. However, this 
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“new” political machine reflected a changing attitude in society and included a businessman as 
Boss instead of a politician.  
Even though the reformers introduced the merit system to ban corruption, nowadays 
corruption in the civil service is still an important issue in New York. The city is also still 
dealing with immigrants of which many are living in conditions which would have been 
unacceptable for Tammany: “Tens of thousands of immigrants without proper papers, without 
citizenship, unable to vote? Tammany’s ward heelers would have seen them not as outcasts but 
as potential allies – and voters – and would have acted accordingly”2. Society and citizens are 
continually subject to change which influence their needs and perception of democratic 
legitimate power. Proximity and reflexivity proof to be effective tools to measure the public 
opinion, societal changes, and thus the level of legitimacy. Impartiality is a significant form of 
legitimacy as well, unfortunately it is difficult to measure legitimacy through impartiality since 
it remains difficult to establish a theoretical and constitutional status. This thesis argues in line 
with Rosanvallon that elections are indeed not the only tool available to measure and establish 
legitimacy. Where Rosanvallon argues that this is a more recent trend, the case of Tammany 
Hall and the civil service reformers illustrates that elements of proximity and reflexivity were 
significant democratic legitimacy tools during the end of the 19th century as well.  
Nonetheless, the importance proximity and reflexive institutions fluctuates over time. 
Tammany Hall gathered its legitimacy through proximity at the end of the 19th century. 
Nowadays, reflexive institutions have grown tremendously through for example social media. 
The problem is that the legitimacy of these “recent” reflexive institutions like social media is 
very difficult to measure. Accusations of “fake-news” are a recent trend and are causing 
legitimacy problems for reflexive institutions. It is difficult to predict how the “extra” forms of 
legitimacy will develop in the future. The most stable tool for legitimacy remains the ballot box. 
In a democracy, it is expected that citizens vote in line with their needs. They force the political 
power to adjust their functioning in accordance with the will of the people through elections. 
The question is whether they perceive the present political power and governmental system to 
be legitimate and whether they want to change it. Even though, as Rosanvallon states, elections 
aren’t sufficient as the only form of legitimacy it remains the foundational practical tool to 
change political power and the governmental system if the people deem to change it. 
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